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I. INTRODUCTION
In Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov,1 the Supreme
Court of Canada attempted to bring clarity and coherence to Canadian administrative law, an area of legal doctrine long characterized by uncertainty and confusion.
The focus in Vavilov was on substantive review, where the “merits” of an
administrative decision are challenged in judicial review proceedings.2 Most judicial
review cases in Canada involve substantive review of matters ranging from the grant
or refusal of passports to national telecommunications policy and turn on whether a
decision was, in whole or in part, incorrect or unreasonable. Challenges to the
procedural fairness of a decision-making process, or the general structure of an
administrative agency, are comparatively rarer. Unfortunately, substantive review —
the task Canadian courts are most often asked to undertake — is the area which has
been wracked by uncertainty and confusion.
Elsewhere, I have critically analyzed the Vavilov decision, carefully scrutinizing
its two principal components — a new test for selecting the standard of review and
a detailed methodology for conducting reasonableness review — and its two
accessory components — the role of past precedents and remedial discretion — with
a view to determining whether the Supreme Court’s attempt to resolve the
*

University Research Chair in Administrative Law & Governance, University of Ottawa.
With thanks to the anonymous reviewer for helpful comments and to Kseniya Kudischeva for
research assistance.
1

[2019] S.C.J. No. 65, 2019 SCC 65 [hereinafter “Vavilov”].

2

Vavilov, at para. 23.
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uncertainty and confusion is likely to be successful.3 In this paper, I seek to place
Vavilov in a broader setting.
Of course, Vavilov represents a response to a set of problems which have plagued
Canadian administrative lawyers for decades. As the majority made clear at the start
of its reasons, it set out to “address two key aspects of the current administrative law
jurisprudence which require reconsideration and clariﬁcation”, namely “determining
the standard of review that applies when a court reviews the merits of an
administrative decision” and providing “additional guidance for reviewing courts to
follow when conducting reasonableness review”.4 More broadly, however, Vavilov
ﬁts into a much larger picture. Recent decades in Canada have seen the seemingly
inexorable rise of “a culture of justiﬁcation in administrative decision making”.5
Central to my analysis will be the conception of reasonableness review developed
by the majority in Vavilov. I will have little to say about selecting the standard of
review, the role of precedent or remedial discretion. That is not because these topics
are unimportant — they will, going forward, be critically important in the Canadian
law of judicial review of administrative action. But they are, essentially, bespoke
technical ﬁxes to problems which have arisen in Canada. The articulation of
Vavilovian reasonableness review, by contrast, is a manifestation of a broader trend
toward a culture of justiﬁcation in administrative law — indeed, in Vavilov, the
majority reasons placed justiﬁcation front and centre in their articulation of
reasonableness review. Despite the culture of justiﬁcation’s contemporary status,
and a signiﬁcant amount of scholarship on its beneﬁts, what it actually consists of
remains somewhat obscure.6 I will suggest in Part II that the four strands of
reasonableness review woven together by the majority in Vavilov — reasoned
decision-making, responsiveness, demonstrated expertise and contextualism —
provide an account of the culture of justiﬁcation. I will also argue in Part III that the
emphasis on these features in substantive review is consistent with developments,
stretching back 50 years, in the law of procedural fairness, the law of substantive
review, and the law of justiciability.
Furthermore, in Part IV I will seek to explain — or at least develop a hypothesis
capable of explaining — the rise of the culture of justiﬁcation. While it is tempting
to attribute the contemporary importance of justiﬁcation in Westminster-style
systems to global factors such as the post-Renaissance rise of rationality, the growth
of popular democracy, the post–World War II culture of human rights, the
shortcomings in accountability of the executive to the legislature, or a general
3

Paul Daly, “The Vavilov Framework and the Future of Canadian Administrative Law”
(2020) 33 Can. J. Admin. L. & Prac. 111.
4

Vavilov, at para. 2.

5

Vavilov, at para. 2.

6

Janina Boughey, “A ‘Culture of Justiﬁcation’ in Administrative Law” (on ﬁle with
author).
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decline in levels of social trust, I identify two interrelated, relatively mundane
explanations which are mostly internal to administrative law.
First, the last half-century has been a formative period for administrative law.
General principles of judicial review of administrative action were developed for the
ﬁrst time, facilitated by a set of legislative and regulatory reforms which decoupled
the substantive law of judicial review from the procedural conﬁnes of the so-called
prerogative writs. The rise of the culture of justiﬁcation, manifested in procedural
fairness, substantive review and the law of justiciability, began soon after the
general principles of judicial review of administrative action were liberated from
their procedural shackles. Second, administrative decisions today are, generally,
reasoned and the records produced for the purposes of judicial review are extensive.
This was not the case in the past. There is now more for judges to get their judicial
review teeth into. Moreover, when judges are faced with extensive reasons and
records, there is a natural inclination for them to carefully review those reasons and
records and, consequently, to develop the law of judicial review to allow them to
correct any errors found in those reasons and records. My hypothesis is that there is
a symbiotic relationship between the rise of the culture of justiﬁcation and the
generation of general principles of administrative law accompanied by the production of reasoned decisions accompanied by elaborate records.
Lastly, I will turn in Part V to the future of the culture of justiﬁcation. I will note
that the reader of Vavilov might be forgiven for developing a sense of déjà vu, for
the rich conception of reasonableness review set out in the majority reasons recalls
the language used a decade earlier in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick.7 There,
“justiﬁcation, transparency, and intelligibility” were said to be central to the
substantive reasonableness of administrative decisions,8 but within a few years the
Supreme Court had for all practical purposes resiled from this language. A culture
of authority — not a culture of justiﬁcation — began to creep into substantive
review. Decisions issued between Dunsmuir and Vavilov echoed older decisions in
which Canadian courts recognized that some decision-makers enjoyed (almost)
exclusive authority within their areas of jurisdiction. Such authority can be
grounded in political legitimacy, expediency, or technocracy. But Vavilov represents
a sweeping repudiation of the culture of authority: the culture of justiﬁcation in
substantive review and in administrative law generally seems to be here to stay. If
my hypotheses are right, reasoned decision-making, demonstrated expertise, responsiveness, and contextualism will continue to be central features of administrative
law well into the future, in Canada and beyond.
In Part II, I describe the articulation of reasonableness review in Vavilov. In Part
III, I identify other areas of administrative law which have been marked by the rise
7

[2008] S.C.J. No. 9, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dunsmuir”].
8

Dunsmuir, at para. 47.
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of a culture of justiﬁcation. In Part IV, I discuss potential explanations for this rise.
In Part V, I conclude by assessing the future prospects of the culture of justiﬁcation,
both in substantive review and more generally. Throughout, my approach is mostly
descriptive and analytical. In the Conclusion, I will offer some brief thoughts on the
appropriateness of the culture of justiﬁcation from a normative perspective. For the
most part, however, I am interested in describing and analyzing what the culture of
justiﬁcation is in the context of the contemporary law of judicial review of
administrative action.
II. VAVILOVIAN REASONABLENESS REVIEW
The term “culture of justiﬁcation” ﬁrst appeared in an article by the South African
scholar Etienne Mureinik. He described the culture of justiﬁcation as one “in which
every exercise of power is expected to be justiﬁed; in which the leadership given by
government rests on the cogency of the case offered in defence of its decisions, not
the fear inspired by the force at its command”.9 Mureinik was writing in the context
of his country’s emergence from the apartheid era; his was a South African
prescription for South Africa at a particular moment in time. But the term and the
“core” idea “that governments should provide substantive justiﬁcation for all their
actions”10 have enthusiastically been taken up by scholars of constitutional and
administrative law elsewhere in the world.11 Those scholars who have written
extensively about the culture of justiﬁcation have devoted signiﬁcant energy to
explaining the salutary beneﬁts of the concept — empowering the administrative
state,12 respecting individuals,13 and informing the review of the proportionality of
legislative interferences with fundamental rights14 — but not as much to providing
a detailed account of what a culture of justiﬁcation entails. Its status is clear; its
characteristics, less so.
The discussion in Vavilov allows us to ﬂesh the culture of justiﬁcation out further.
9

Etienne Mureinik, “A Bridge to Where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights” (1994)
10 S.A.J.H.R. 31, at 32.
10

Moshe Cohen-Eliya & Iddo Porat, “Proportionality and the Culture of Justiﬁcation”
(2011) 59 Am. J. Comp. L. 463, at 466.
11
See e.g. David Dyzenhaus, “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy” in Michael Taggart, ed., The Province of Administrative Law (Oxford: Hart, 1997), at
279; Michael Taggart, “Deference, Proportionality, Wednesbury” [2008] New Zealand Law
Review 423; Mark Elliott, “Has the Common Law Duty to Give Reasons Come of Age Yet?”
[2011] Public Law 56.
12

See e.g. David Dyzenhaus, “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy” in Michael Taggart, ed., The Province of Administrative Law (Oxford: Hart, 1997), at
279.
13

See e.g. Kai Möller, “Justifying the Culture of Justiﬁcation” (2019) 17 International
Journal of Constitutional Law 1078.
14

See e.g. Moshe Cohen-Eliya & Iddo Porat, “Proportionality and Justiﬁcation” (2014)
64 U.T.L.J. 458.
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Prior to Vavilov, the Supreme Court of Canada had said little about the meaning or
methodology of reasonableness review. Indeed, its pronouncements on or applications of reasonableness review gave very little guidance to reviewing courts on how
to determine whether a given administrative decision was reasonable or unreasonable.15 Acknowledging that the Supreme Court had, in its previous decisions given
“relatively little guidance on how to conduct reasonableness review in practice”,16
the majority set out to provide such guidance. In the majority’s account, reasonableness review is “a robust form of review”.17 Four strands are woven together.18
First, reasoned decision-making. The underlying principle is “that the exercise
of public power must be justiﬁed, intelligible and transparent, not in the abstract, but
to the individuals subject to it”.19 Accordingly, any decision must be “justiﬁed in
relation to the constellation of law and facts that are relevant to the decision”,20 not
merely one that “falls” within a “range” of possible, acceptable outcomes. The onus
is on the applicant for judicial review to satisfy the reviewing court that there are
“serious shortcomings” in the decision21 but the decision-maker nonetheless
shoulders a heavier burden than she did prior to Vavilov.22 As Diner J. sagely noted
in Ortiz v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), whereas under
Dunsmuir reviewing courts began with the outcome and then looked back at the
reasons, Vavilov instructs them “to start with the reasons, and assess whether they
justify the outcome”.23 The emphasis here is on reasoned decision-making, rather
than reasons tout court, for reasons are not required in all cases. Even where reasons
15

See e.g. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, [2016] F.C.J.
No. 313, 2016 FCA 93 at para. 41 (F.C.A.).
16

Vavilov, at para. 73.

17

Vavilov, at para. 13. See the concurring reasons, at para. 294.

18

For the most part, subject to a point to be discussed in Part V below, the majority and
minority judges occupied common ground on the methodology of reasonableness review.
Paul Daly, “The Vavilov Framework and the Future of Canadian Administrative Law” (2020)
33 Can. J. Admin. L. Prac. 111, at 125-27.
19

Vavilov, at para. 95.

20

Vavilov, at para. 105 [emphasis added].

21

Vavilov, at para. 100.

22

As I have remarked:
My view is that the methodology of Vavilovian reasonableness review is inherently
deferential. But it is certainly arguable that Vavilov has, in respect of supplementation,
responsiveness, and justiﬁcation, set a slightly higher bar for decision-makers than the
pre-Vavilov regime.

Paul Daly, “Vavilov Hits the Road (Updated Feb 27)” (February 4, 2020), Paul Daly,
Administrative Law Matters (blog), online: <https://pauldaly.openum.ca/blog/2020/02/04/
vavilov-hits-the-road/>.

23

[2020] F.C.J. No. 142, 2020 FC 188, at para. 22 (F.C.).
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are not provided, “the reasoning process that underlies the decision will not usually
be opaque” and ﬁt the description of reasoned decision-making.24
The emphasis on reasoned decision-making in Vavilov is unsurprising, for the
most obvious implication of the development of a culture of justiﬁcation in
administrative law is that administrative “decisions should survive review as long as
they are shown by the reasons provided to be justiﬁable”.25 Reasoned decisionmaking is, indeed, the “motor” of the methodology of the culture of justiﬁcation.26
The central concern of reasoned decision-making is with the adequacy — or
substantive reasonableness — of the reasons given in support of a decision.27
Second, responsiveness. A decision-maker’s reasons must respond to “the central
issues and concerns raised by the parties”.28 This amounts to an obligation not
merely to hear the parties but to demonstrate that they have been listened to:
“[R]easons are the primary mechanism by which decision makers demonstrate that
they have actually listened to the parties.”29 Moreover, in situations where a
decision will have “particularly harsh consequences for an affected individual”,30 a
decision-maker comes under a “heightened responsibility . . . to ensure that their
reasons demonstrate that they have considered the consequences of a decision and
that those consequences are justiﬁed in light of the facts and law”.31 This places the
individual at the centre of the reason-giving process, making the “perspective of the
24
Vavilov, at para. 137. In those situations where no reasons were provided and the record
sheds no light on the basis for decision, a reviewing court may focus on the outcome rather
than the reasons, but “[t]his does not mean that reasonableness review is less robust in such
circumstances, only that it takes a different shape” (at para. 138).
25

David Dyzenhaus, “Proportionality and Deference in a Culture of Justiﬁcation” in
Grant Huscroft, Bradley Miller & Grégoire Webber, eds., Proportionality and the Rule of
Law: Rights, Justiﬁcation, Reasoning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) 234,
at 255.
26

Michael Taggart, “Deference, Proportionality, Wednesbury” [2008] New Zealand Law
Review 423, at 461.
27

See e.g. Leighton McDonald, “Reasons, Reasonableness and Intelligible Justiﬁcation in
Judicial Review” (2015) 37 Sydney L. Rev. 467. The culture of justiﬁcation is often
associated with the imposition of a duty to give reasons. See e.g. Mark Elliott, “Has the
Common Law Duty to Give Reasons Come of Age Yet?” [2011] Public Law 56. But there
is still no general common law duty to give reasons. Rather, the demands of reasoned
decision-making drive administrative decision-makers who wish their decisions to withstand
the rigours of judicial review to provide detailed reasons even in the absence of a speciﬁc,
judicially imposed duty to provide reasons. See further the discussion in Part IV below.
28

Vavilov, at para. 127.

29

Vavilov, at para. 127 [emphasis in original].

30

Vavilov, at para. 133.

31

Vavilov, at para. 135.
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individual or party over whom authority is being exercised” vitally important.32
This emphasis on responsiveness echoes the Supreme Court’s insistence in Baker
that a decision-maker should be “alert, alive and sensitive” to important considerations raised by an individual.33 Already in the light of Baker, Mary Liston
identiﬁed an ethos of justiﬁcation in Canadian public law,34 pursuant to which
“citizens and residents are democratically and often constitutionally entitled to
participate in decisions which affect their rights, interests and privileges”.35 In a
recent book on administrative justice, Zachary Richards suggests that modern trends
in public administration have created a new mode of decision-making, which he
terms “responsive legality”.36 Richards does not use, or even refer to, the culture of
justiﬁcation, but his emphasis on the importance of responsiveness meshes very well
with the articulation of reasonableness review in Vavilov.
Third, demonstrated expertise. In general, reasons “are the primary mechanism
by which administrative decision makers show that their decisions are reasonable”.37 Only the “demonstrated experience and expertise” of an administrative
decision-maker will help to support the conclusion that a given decision was
reasonable.38 Reviewing courts are not to assume that a decision-maker is expert, or
indeed that the decision-maker has considered all of the relevant material: its
expertise (and its responsiveness and reasoned decision-making) must be demon32

Vavilov, at para. 133.

33

Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] S.C.J. No. 39,
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, at para. 75 (S.C.C.).
34

The phrase is that of the Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, “The Roles of
Administrative Tribunals and Courts in Maintaining the Rule of Law” (1998) 12 Can. J.
Admin. L. & Prac. 171.
35

Mary Liston, “‘Alert, alive and sensitive’: Baker, the Duty to Give Reasons, and the
Ethos of Justiﬁcation in Canadian Public Law” in David Dyzenhaus, ed., The Unity of Public
Law (Oxford: Hart, 2004) 113, at 114.
36

Zachary Richards, Responsive Legality: The New Administrative Justice (Abingdon,
UK: Routledge, 2019), at 3. As he explains:
When justifying decisions according to this type, public officials value responsiveness in
that they cling to a generalisation of purpose that aims to distinguish what is truly
necessary for each particular applicant, rather than what has come to be taken for granted
in traditions and routines. They deeply value ﬂexibility and adaptability and aim to deal
with situations on a case-by-case basis, drawing ﬁrm justiﬁcation for their decision from
the extent to which they were able to adaptively respond to the overall set of
circumstances that presented themselves in that particular case. In this sense, decision
makers operating within this mode are chameleon-like and respond with enthusiasm to
changed circumstances in the purposive pursuit of good outcomes.
37

Vavilov, at para. 81. See the concurring reasons, at paras. 291, 296.

38

Vavilov, at para. 93 [emphasis added].
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strated.39 Administrative law is not now about top-down assertions of authority but
about exercises of public power which are justiﬁed to those on the receiving end.40
Moreover, expertise is to be demonstrated contemporaneously with the issuance
of a decision. The only conceptual point about reasonableness review about which
the majority and minority judges disagreed in Vavilov was whether reviewing courts
should take “a ﬂexible approach to supplementing reasons”,41 with the majority
much less permissive in this regard. Reviewing courts are to refrain from bolstering
defective administrative decisions with post-hoc reasoning supplied by the decision39

See e.g. Farrier v. Canada (Attorney General), [2020] F.C.J. No. 167, 2020 FCA 25,
at para. 10 (F.C.A.); Mattar v. National Dental Examining Board of Canada, [2020] O.J. No.
779, 2020 ONSC 403, at paras. 51-52 (Ont. Div. Ct.); Walker v. Canada (Department of
Environment and Climate Change, Deputy Head), [2020] F.C.J. No. 223, 2020 FCA 44, at
para. 10 (F.C.A.).
40
I note the possibility, raised by Jennifer Raso, “Unity in the Eye of the Beholder?
Reasons for Decision in Theory and Practice in the Ontario Works Program” (2020) 70
U.T.L.J. 1, that reasons for administrative decisions are sometimes (and in some systems
often) provided not for the beneﬁt of the individual concerned but for purposes internal to the
administrative decision-making structure. The culture of justiﬁcation, as I am describing it,
has been developed by those looking at public administration from the perspective of judicial
review of administrative action. In determining the reasonableness or fairness of a decision,
a court will look to the available material to try and discern a rationale; this is a function of
the institutional role of courts in a common law system of administrative law. The result is,
in at least some situations, a degree of artiﬁciality as judges treat as “reasons” internal
communications which were never intended to be sent to an individual claimant, still less
scrutinized by a court. More generally, proponents of a culture of justiﬁcation should be
aware that their prescriptions touch only the tip of the iceberg of public administration. In
many administrative decision-making structures, front-line decisions are not judicially
reviewed at all. It would be wrong to think that the culture of justiﬁcation referenced in
Vavilov guides this sort of decision-making. Equally, however, just because the culture of
justiﬁcation does not permeate all public administration does not mean that it has no
relevance to administrative decision-making. In any decision-making structure a ﬁnal
decision, perhaps taken by a tribunal, will be subject to judicial review. In respect of these
ﬁnal decisions, it is entirely appropriate to speak of a culture of justiﬁcation where exercises
of state power have to be justiﬁed to the individual concerned (and, on judicial review, to the
courts). It is also worth noting that the decisions of some front-line decision-makers, such as
visa officers, are directly reviewed by the courts and, as such, might be coaxed into
developing a culture of justiﬁcation. But Raso’s excellent empirical work serves to remind
administrative lawyers that there is a world of difference between the cloistered world of
judicial review of administrative action and the sweaty front lines of public administration.
41

Vavilov, at para. 302. For the most part, subject to a point to be discussed in Part V
below, the majority and minority judges occupied common ground on the methodology of
reasonableness review. Paul Daly, “The Vavilov Framework and the Future of Canadian
Administrative Law” (2020) 33 Can. J. Admin. L. Prac. 111, at 125-27.
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maker in an affidavit,42 clever counsel at the lectern43 or by the reviewing court
itself.44 Reviewing courts are not to conduct a “line-by-line treasure hunt for
error”45 or reweigh evidence considered by the decision-maker,46 and should read
administrative decisions “with sensitivity to the institutional setting and in light of
the record”.47 But a reviewing court should not “fashion its own reasons in order to
buttress the administrative decision”.48 If reasoned decision-making, responsiveness
and demonstrated expertise are not present in the reasons given to the affected
individual or parties, a court should ordinarily not permit them to be “coopered up”
later on,49 for fear that the reasons will not reﬂect the exercise of expert judgment
by the decision-maker as “a decision-maker might be tempted to take a less rigorous
approach to decision-making if it knows it can supplement its reasons later”.50
Demonstrated expertise was an important component of the inﬂuential explanation of “deference as respect” offered by David Dyzenhaus,51 one of the earliest
adopters and tenacious advocates of the culture of justiﬁcation.52 When applying an
appropriately deferential approach to judicial review of administrative interpretations of law, the question “for the court is not . . . what decision it might have
reached had the tribunal not pronounced, but whether the reasons offered by the
42
Saskatchewan (Minister of Energy and Resources) v. Areva Resources Canada Inc.,
[2013] S.J. No. 439, 2013 SKCA 79, at paras. 36, 110 (Sask. C.A.).
43

McLean v. British Columbia (Securities Commission), [2013] S.C.J. No. 67, 2013 SCC
67, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 895, at para. 72 (S.C.C.).
44

Agraira v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), [2013] S.C.J. No. 36,
2013 SCC 36, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 559, at para. 58 (S.C.C.).
45
Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, Local 30 v. Irving Pulp
& Paper, Ltd., [2013] S.C.J. No. 34, 2013 SCC 34, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 458, at para. 54 (S.C.C.);
Vavilov, at para. 102.
46
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa, [2009] S.C.J. No. 12,
2009 SCC 12, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339, at para. 64 (S.C.C.); Vavilov, at para. 125.
47

Vavilov, at para. 96.

48

Vavilov, at para. 96.

49

Canada v. Kabul Farms Inc., [2016] F.C.J. No. 480, 2016 FCA 143, at para. 47
(F.C.A.), per Stratas J.A.
50

Paul Daly, “Reasons and Reasonableness in Administrative Law: Delta Air Lines Inc.
v. Lukacs” (2018) 31 Can. J. Admin. L. & Prac. 209, at 214.
51

And applied with gusto by the Supreme Court in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008]
S.C.J. No. 9, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, at para. 48 (S.C.C.) and Newfoundland and
Labrador Nurses’ Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), [2011] S.C.J. No.
62, 2011 SCC 62, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 708, at paras. 11-12 (S.C.C.).
52

David Dyzenhaus, “Law as Justiﬁcation: Etienne Mureinik’s Conception of Legal
Culture” (1998) 14 S.A.J.H.R. 11; “Dignity in Administrative Law: Judicial Deference in a
Culture of Justiﬁcation” (2012) 17 Rev. Const. Stud. 87.
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tribunal justify its decision”.53 Dyzenhaus offered formal and substantive justiﬁcations for this approach. The formal justiﬁcation was that the legislature had chosen
the decision-maker, not a court, to resolve the questions at issue. The substantive
justiﬁcation rested on the “considerable expertise” the decision-maker may have
developed.54 But any such expertise had to be demonstrated, as a court should ask
whether the reasoning offered by the decision-maker “did in fact and could in
principle justify the conclusion reached”.55 Demonstrated expertise has, as such,
roots in the culture of justiﬁcation.
Fourth, contextualism. Reasonableness is heavily dependent on “contextual
constraints”: “[W]hat is reasonable in a given situation will always depend on the
constraints imposed by the legal and factual context of the particular decision under
review.”56 Courts are not to attempt to pigeonhole decisions in particular categories
with a view to assessing lawfulness but rather to appreciate decisions in their whole
context. Judges should also be “acutely aware” that “‘[a]dministrative justice’ will
not always look like ‘judicial justice’”;57 the context of public administration is
often quite different from the context of judicial decision-making. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court recognized that there is no bright line between process and
substance, acknowledging that whether the duty of fairness requires reasons to be
given in a particular case “will impact how a court conducts reasonableness
review”.58
Again, contextualism features prominently in Dyzenhaus’s scholarship. Already
in his explanation of deference of respect, he noted that the approach applied
“whether the issue is fact or law (including the tribunal’s powers, other statutes, the
common law, and constitutional law)”,59 eschewing traditional doctrinal boundaries;
he has argued in favour of a uniﬁed approach to judicial review of administrative
action, with the same standards applying in cases involving “rights” and those which
53
David Dyzenhaus, “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy” in
Michael Taggart, ed., The Province of Administrative Law (Oxford: Hart, 1997) 279, at 303.
54
David Dyzenhaus, “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy” in
Michael Taggart, ed., The Province of Administrative Law (Oxford: Hart, 1997) 279, at 304.
55

David Dyzenhaus, “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy” in
Michael Taggart, ed., The Province of Administrative Law (Oxford: Hart, 1997) 279, at 304.
This component was, unfortunately, overlooked by the Supreme Court in the decade after
Dunsmuir. See Mary Liston, “Deference as Respect – Lost in Translation?” in Paul Daly &
Léonid Sirota, eds., The Dunsmuir Decade/Les 10 ans de Dunsmuir (2018 Special Issue) Can.
J. Admin. L. & Prac. at 47.
56

Vavilov, at para. 90. See the concurring reasons, at paras. 292-293.

57

Vavilov, at para. 92.

58

Vavilov, at para. 76.

59

David Dyzenhaus, “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy” in
Michael Taggart, ed., The Province of Administrative Law (Oxford: Hart, 1997) 279, at 304.
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do not;60 he has been skeptical of the monist distinction between incorporated and
unincorporated human rights treaties;61 and he has insisted that there is no “hard and
fast distinction between process and substance”.62 The point for Dyzenhaus in his
scholarship (sometimes solo, sometimes with others) as much as for the Supreme
Court in its explication of reasonableness review in Vavilov is that the analysis is
contextual rather than categorical, based on a variety of substantive considerations
rather than on a limited number of bright-line distinctions.63
Admittedly, there is some vacillation in Vavilov as to the importance of context.
In developing a new framework for substantive review, the majority sought to
remove the “vexing” contextual factors, such as relative expertise, from the
selection of the standard of review.64 Going forward, statutory appeals will be
subject to the appellate review framework (not Vavilovian reasonableness review),
with extricable questions of law assessed on a correctness basis and everything else
— questions of fact and questions of mixed fact and law — on the palpable and
overriding error standard.65 Although this shift attracted vociferous criticism from
the minority judges,66 there is reason to think that context will prove too tenacious
an adversary for the majority in Vavilov: in classifying issues as extricable questions
of law or as mixed questions, courts will inevitably be inﬂuenced by the substantive
60

David Dyzenhaus, Murray Hunt & Michael Taggart, “The Principle of Legality in
Administrative Law: Internationalisation as Constitutionalisation” (2001) 1 O.U.C.L.J. 5;
David Dyzenhaus, “Proportionality and Deference in a Culture of Justiﬁcation” in Grant
Huscroft, Bradley Miller & Grégoire Webber, eds., Proportionality and the Rule of Law:
Rights, Justiﬁcation, Reasoning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), at 234.
61

David Dyzenhaus, Murray Hunt & Michael Taggart, “The Principle of Legality in
Administrative Law: Internationalisation as Constitutionalisation” (2001) 1 O.U.C.L.J. 5;
David Dyzenhaus & Evan Fox-Decent, “Rethinking the Process/Substance Distinction: Baker
v. Canada” (2001) 51 U.T.L.J. 193, at 233-34.
62
David Dyzenhaus & Evan Fox-Decent, “Rethinking the Process/Substance Distinction:
Baker v. Canada” (2001) 51 U.T.L.J. 193, at 238. See also David Mullan, “Baker v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship &Immigration) – A Deﬁning Moment in Canadian Administrative
Law” (1999) 7 Reid’s Administrative Law 145, at 151; and Mary Liston, “Transubstantiation
in Canadian Public Law: Processing Substance and Instantiating Process” in John Bell et al.,
eds., Public Law Adjudication in Common Law Systems: Process and Substance (Oxford:
Hart, 2016), at 213.
63
See also Paul Daly, “The Unfortunate Triumph of Form over Substance in Canadian
Administrative Law” (2012) 50 Osgoode Hall L.J. 317.
64

Vavilov, at para. 200.

65

See generally Housen v. Nikolaisen, [2002] S.C.J. No. 31, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2
S.C.R. 235 (S.C.C.).
66
Justices Abella and Karakatsanis described the majority’s reasons as “an encomium for
correctness and a eulogy for deference”: Vavilov, at para. 201.
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expertise of the decision-maker;67 and even in applying the correctness standard,
may consider that the better answer is the one provided by the decision-maker,
especially if the decision-maker has relevant specialized expertise.68 Accordingly,
context is likely to remain important.69
Taken together, reasoned decision-making, responsiveness, demonstrated
expertise, and contextualism provide a relatively detailed picture of the culture of
justiﬁcation. As I will demonstrate in the next Part, the picture painted in the
majority reasons in Vavilov coheres with the broader tapestry of contemporary
administrative law. These characteristics are not found only in the area of
substantive review but everywhere in the law of judicial review of administrative
action.
III. JUSTIFICATION

IN

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

To observe the mid-20th century literature on administrative law is to look at a
world very different from ours. This was the time of the “long sleep” of
administrative law,70 a prolonged period of judicial somnolence which gave rise to
fears that we had witnessed the “twilight” of judicial review71 or, at the very least,
stern warnings that we were at a “crossroads”.72 Standing in the way of progress,
clanking their medieval chains,73 were the tripartite classiﬁcation of functions into
“administrative”, “legislative”, and “judicial” (only the last attracting much in the
way of judicial control); a stark distinction between reviewable “rights” and
unreviewable “privileges”; a deep divide between “jurisdictional” error, which
67
See e.g. the range of issues said to be subject to the palpable and overriding error
standard in Yee v. Chartered Professional Accountants of Alberta, [2020] A.J. No. 291, 2020
ABCA 98, at para. 30 (Alta. C.A.).
68
See e.g. Planet Energy (Ontario) Corp. v. Ontario (Energy Board), [2020] O.J. No.
442, 2020 ONSC 598, at para. 31 (Ont. Div. Ct.), per Swinton J.:

While the Court will ultimately review the interpretation of the Act on a standard of
correctness, respect for the specialized function of the Board still remains important.
One of the important messages in Vavilov is the need for the courts to respect the
institutional design chosen by the Legislature when it has established an administrative
tribunal (at para. 36). In the present case, the Court would be greatly assisted with its
interpretive task if it had the assistance of the Board’s interpretation respecting the words
of the Act, the general scheme of the Act and the policy objectives behind the provision.
69

See also Paul Daly, “The Unfortunate Triumph of Form over Substance in Canadian
Administrative Law” (2012) 50 Osgoode Hall L.J. 317 and “Dunsmuir’s Flaws Exposed:
Recent Decisions on Standard of Review” (2012) 58 McGill L.J. 483.
70

Robert Stevens, The English Judges (Oxford: Hart, 2005), at 19.

71

Gerald Le Dain, “The Twilight of Judicial Control in the Province of Quebec?” (1952)
1 McGill L.J. 1.
72

H.W.R. Wade, “Crossroads in Administrative Law” [1968] Current Leg. Probs. 75.

73

United Australia Ltd. v. Barclay’s Bank Ltd., [1941] A.C. 1, at 29.
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attracted de novo judicial review, and “non-jurisdictional” error, which attracted
none at all; and, of course, the procedural and technical restrictions encrusted like
barnacles on the hull of the prerogative writs, which had evolved to be the primary
means of judicial control of public administration. In that period, despite the
creation of an enormous administrative state, with welfare, regulatory and managerial functions, vast swathes of public administration were immune from judicial
oversight.74 Even judicial imposition of procedural controls on how public officials
could make decisions — putting no fetter on the substance of those decisions —
could not be taken for granted.
This was soon to change. The origin story of contemporary administrative law
involves academics, judges and politicians working in consort to transform judicial
review of administrative action.75 In his classic text, Judicial Review of Administrative Action,76 Professor de Smith “provided the academic systematization of the
principles of judicial review”;77 in landmark decisions such as Ridge v. Baldwin,78
Anisminic v. Foreign Compensation Commission79 and Padﬁeld v. Minister of
Agriculture,80 the House of Lords cast aside the tripartite classiﬁcation, the
rights/privileges distinction and the jurisdictional/non-jurisdictional error divide;
and politicians effected or permitted, through legislation and delegated legislation,
procedural reforms which replaced the barnacled prerogative writs with a uniﬁed
application for judicial review.81 Whereas Lord Reid could safely say in the 1960s
that England knew no developed system of administrative law, just 20 years later —
the blink of an eye in common law terms — Lord Diplock conﬁdently stated: “[T]he
English law relating to judicial control of administrative action has been developed
upon a case to case basis which has virtually transformed it over the last three
decades.”82
74

See generally Stanley Alexander de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action
(London: Stevens & Sons, 1959).
75
For a different perspective, see T.T. Arvind & Lindsay Stirton, “The Curious Origins
of Judicial Review” (2017) 133 Law Q. Rev. 91.
76
Stanley Alexander de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (London:
Stevens & Sons, 1959).
77

John Bell, “Comparative Administrative Law” in Mathias Reimann & Reinhard
Zimmermann, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2006) 1259, at 1285.
78

[1964] A.C. 40.

79

[1969] 2 A.C. 147.

80

[1968] A.C. 997.

81

See e.g. R. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte National Federation of
Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd., [1982] A.C. 617, at 657, per Lord Roskill.
82

Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, [1985] A.C. 374, at

407.
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Similar transformations occurred in Canada: for Professor de Smith, read
Professors Arthurs,83 Hogg,84 Mullan85 and Weiler;86 procedural reforms were
effected at the federal and provincial level;87 and, over the years, the Canadian
judiciary invigorated the law of judicial review of administrative action.88
Nicholson effected a similar change to Ridge v. Baldwin, such that where once
procedural protections attached only to decisions taken “judicially”, having an
impact on “rights”,89 they could by the early 1980s be imposed by judges in respect
of any decision affecting “the rights, interests, property, privileges, or liberties of
any person”.90 The old law of “natural justice”, closely modelled on the trial-type
procedures employed by courts, was replaced by a context-sensitive “duty of
fairness”, where the question a reviewing court must ask is: “What procedural
protections, if any, are necessary for this particular decision-making process?”91 In
particular, individuals are entitled to fair warning of potentially adverse decisions
and an opportunity to respond. Indeed, there is an increasing trend toward “active
adjudication”, where an administrative decision-maker becomes more actively
involved within a hearing process,92 and, arguably, toward “responsive legality”.93
83

H.W. Arthurs, “Rethinking Judicial Review: A Slightly Dicey Business” (1979) 17
Osgoode Hall L.J. 1.
84

P.W. Hogg, “Judicial Review in Canada: How Much Do We Need It?” (1974) 26
Osgoode Hall L.J. 337.
85

D.J. Mullan, “Fairness: The New Natural Justice” (1975) 25 U.T.L.J. 281.

86

P.C. Weiler, “The Slippery Slope of Judicial Intervention: The Supreme Court and
Canadian Labour Relations 1950-1970” (1971) 9 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1.
87

See e.g. David Mullan, “Reform of Administrative Law Remedies: Method or
Madness?” [1975] Federal Law Review 340; John Evans, “Judicial Review in Ontario —
Recent Developments in the Remedies — Some Problems of Pouring Old Wine into New
Bottles” (1977) 55 Can. Bar Rev. 148.
88

Re Nicholson and Haldiman-Norfolk Regional Board of Commissioners of Police,
[1978] S.C.J. No. 88, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 311 (S.C.C.).
89

R. v. Electricity Commissioners, ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee Company
(1920) Ltd., [1924] 1 K.B. 171.
90
Martineau v. Matsqui Institution, [1979] S.C.J. No. 121, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 602, at 623
(S.C.C.), per Dickson J., dissenting, but in terms that were later adopted in Cardinal v. Kent
Institution, [1985] S.C.J. No. 78, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 643 (S.C.C.). See e.g. Irvine v. Canada
(Restrictive Trade Practices Commission), [1987] S.C.J. No. 7, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 181 (S.C.C.),
applying procedural fairness to a non-judicial regulatory investigation which concerned
privileges, not rights.
91

David Mullan, “Fairness: The New Natural Justice” (1975) 25 U.T.L.J. 281, at 315.

92

See generally Robert Thomas, “From ‘Adversarial v. Inquisitorial’ to ‘Active,
Enabling, and Investigative’: Developments in UK Administrative Tribunals” and Lorne
Sossin & Sarah Green, “Administrative Justice and Innovation: Beyond the Adversarial/
Inquisitorial Dichotomy” in Laverne Jacobs & Sasha Baglay, eds., The Nature of Inquisitorial
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Moreover, the impact of a decision on an individual has come to play an important
role in determining the extent of the procedural protections required in a given case:
“The more important the decision is to the lives of those affected and the greater its
impact on that person or those persons, the more stringent the procedural protections
that will be mandated”.94
A wider variety of grounds of review became available of governmental action,
a trend visible across the common law world.95 In Canada, this manifested itself in
the development of a “pragmatic and functional” approach to judicial review. Rather
than relying on a stark distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional
errors, Canadian courts employed a variety of contextual factors to calibrate the
appropriate intensity of review — correctness, reasonableness simpliciter and patent
unreasonableness — for any given case.96 On the application of any of these
standards, reviewing courts were able to probe the reasons and the record to identify
any ﬂaws in an impugned administrative decision: even the standard of patent
unreasonableness was not a blank cheque which counsel could brandish at oral
argument on judicial review, for even on the application of this highly deferential
standard, obvious errors were subject to correction.
No-go areas were eliminated, as the boundaries of non-justiciability were pushed
back. In Operation Dismantle Inc. v. Canada, the Supreme Court held that a state
actor could not shelter from claim of a Charter97 violation by invoking nonjusticiability.98 All governmental action was, in principle, open to review for Charter
compliance. Governmental action with a statutory basis was subject to judicial
review in the superior courts,99 a constitutional control which, the Supreme Court
held, could not be ousted by ordinary legislation.100 Prerogative power has also
Processes in Administrative Regimes (London: Routledge, 2016).
93

Zach Richards, Responsive Legality: The New Administrative Justice (Abingdon, UK:
Routledge, 2019).
94

Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] S.C.J. No. 39,
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, at para. 25 (S.C.C.).
95
See generally Paul Daly, “Substantive Review in the Common Law World: AAA v.
Minister for Justice in Comparative Perspective” [2019] Irish Supreme Court Review 105;
Dean Knight, Vigilance and Restraint in the Common Law of Judicial Review (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2018).
96

The apotheosis of this approach was Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), [1998] S.C.J. No. 46, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982 (S.C.C.).
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Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
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[1985] S.C.J. No. 22, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 (S.C.C.).
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Dunsmuir, at para. 28.

100

Crevier v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1981] S.C.J. No. 80, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 220
(S.C.C.).
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come under judicial scrutiny, haltingly at times101 but more conﬁdently in recent
years, with more attention to the particular context in which prerogative action is
sought to be challenged.102 Judicial review has also been extended to private bodies
exercising public power103 and the law of standing has been signiﬁcantly liberalized.104 In all of these areas, contemporary Canadian law is highly sensitive to
context.
It bears mentioning, ﬁnally, that governmental bodies have a duty to consult with
Indigenous peoples when the rights protected by section 35 of the Charter might be
affected by regulatory decisions.105 Even on decisions relating to economic matters
of national concern, consultation may be required, in which case the Crown must
“act with good faith to provide meaningful consultation appropriate to the
circumstances”.106 Administrative decision-makers, too, may fall under the consultation obligation,107 meaning they will have to draw Indigenous peoples into their
decision-making processes and “show that [they have] considered and addressed the
rights claimed by Indigenous peoples in a meaningful way”.108
Across all of these areas, a culture of justiﬁcation can be observed in operation.
All exercises of public power must be justiﬁed by reference to reasoned decisions,
with the boundaries of justiciability pushed back dramatically and the scope of
judicial review remedies extended widely. It is, moreover, implicit if not explicit that
demonstrated expertise must be brought to bear by administrative decision-makers
who seek to justify their decisions. Nowadays, “it is not open to the government to
say, ‘Trust us, we got it right.’”109 In addition, administrative decision-makers must
101

Paul Daly, “Royal Treatment: The Special Status of the Crown in Administrative
Law” (2017) 22 Rev. Const. Stud. 81.
102
Hupacasath First Nation v. Canada (Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Canada), [2015] F.C.J. No. 4, 2015 FCA 4, at para. 67 (F.C.A.).
103
See generally the discussion in Air Canada v. Toronto Port Authority, [2011] F.C.J.
No. 1725, 2011 FCA 347, [2013] 3 F.C.R. 605 (F.C.A.).
104

See generally Canada (Attorney General) v. Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United
Against Violence Society, [2012] S.C.J. No. 45, 2012 SCC 45, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 524 (S.C.C.).
105

See Mary Liston, “Transubstantiation in Canadian Public Law: Processing Substance
and Instantiating Process” in John Bell et al., eds., Public Law Adjudication in Common Law
Systems: Process and Substance (Oxford: Hart, 2016) 213, at 226-30.
106

Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] S.C.J. No. 70, 2004
SCC 73, at para. 41 (S.C.C.).
107
Clyde River (Hamlet) v. Petroleum Geo Services Inc., [2017] S.C.J. No. 40, 2017 SCC
40 (S.C.C.); Chippewas of the Thames First Nation v. Enbridge Pipelines Inc., [2017] S.C.J.
No. 41, 2017 SCC 41 (S.C.C.).
108

Coldwater First Nation v. Canada (Attorney General), [2020] F.C.J. No. 149, 2020
FCA 34, at para. 40 (F.C.A.).
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be responsive, giving individuals an opportunity to participate fully in the
decision-making process and changing their approach in-hearing if necessary, a
requirement which is most visible in the duty to consult Indigenous peoples but
which can be perceived in all areas of public administration. And there are few if any
rules, as such; in contemporary Canadian administrative law, contextual analysis
has ousted categorical analysis. In summary, top-down assertions of authority are
insufficient in contemporary administrative law: individuals must be treated with
concern and respect and all areas of governmental activity will be scrutinized in a
context-sensitive manner for compliance with the law of judicial review of
administrative action. This is the essence of administrative law’s culture of
justiﬁcation.
IV. EXPLAINING

THE

RISE

OF JUSTIFICATION

What might explain the increased emphasis in contemporary administrative law
on reasoned decision-making, demonstrated expertise, responsiveness and
contextualism? It is, of course, impossible to provide a conclusive answer to this
question. Developing a hypothesis is, by contrast, perfectly feasible. Broadly
speaking, the hypotheses relating to the rise of the culture of justiﬁcation can be
placed on a spectrum running from exogenous at the one end to endogenous at the
other.
Exogenous factors would treat the culture of justiﬁcation in administrative law as
epiphenomenal, a manifestation of broader cultural, economic, social or political
forces.110 It could be a product of the post-Renaissance rise of rationality, which is
not easily compatible with top-down assertions of authority. Similarly, the idea that
governmental action having an effect on individual interests must be justiﬁed (and
is unlawful if not) might be thought to be cohesive with the post–World War II
emergence of human rights law. Relatedly, the underlying theory of popular
democracy, which emerged in its fullest form across the Western world only in the
last century, is that individuals are entitled to have a say in how they are governed,
carrying with it the implication that governmental decisions adverse to individuals’
interests ought to be justiﬁed. General declines in levels of social trust, or trust in
authority, might also explain increased demands for justiﬁcation. And, as at least one
leading judge has suggested, the decline in the perceived effectiveness of the
accountability of the executive to the legislature led courts to occupy the “dead
4394, 2018 ONSC 5062, at para. 62 (Ont. S.C.J.), per Myers J., citing Tsleil-Waututh Nation
v. Canada (Attorney General), [2017] F.C.J. No. 601, 2017 FCA 128, at para. 79 (F.C.A.),
per Stratas J.A.
110
See e.g. Jeffrey Jowell et al., de Smith’s Judicial Review, 8th ed. (London: Sweet &
Maxwell, 2018), at para. 1-003: “Against a general background of increasing expectations of
fairness, rationality and justiﬁcation in public affairs, the courts have developed more
exacting legal standards (especially since the 1960s) and have applied these to a wider variety
of decision-makers.”
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ground” vacated by political actors.111
Not being an historian, political scientist, philosopher or sociologist, I am not as
interested in exogenous factors as I am in endogenous factors. Two appear to me to
be relevant: the development of context-sensitive, general principles of administrative law; and the more expansive reasons and records on which administrative
decisions are nowadays based. My hypothesis is that there is a symbiotic
relationship between these two factors.
The ﬁrst is the development, since the 1960s and 1970s, of general principles of
administrative law. What we now call “administrative law” or “judicial review of
administrative action” began to develop, many centuries ago, in the form of the writs
of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus. These writs
were originally designed, by judges sitting in the King’s common law courts in
Westminster, to control the actions of so-called “inferior” courts around the country.
Today’s centralized court system was then in the earliest stages of its development;
most justice was administered locally or in ecclesiastical courts. Over the centuries,
the common law courts extended the scope of the prerogative writs to cover a wider
and wider range of bodies, generally reasoning by analogy to justify issuing writs
against decision-makers which were not, strictly speaking, “inferior” courts. While
the prerogative writs were used to control the actions of an array of administrative
decision-makers, there was no “administrative law” as such. As with the common
law generally prior to the reforms effected by the Judicature Acts in the late 19th
century, there were no general principles but various, discrete bodies of law relating
to the individual writs: there was a “law” relating to certiorari, prohibition and so
on but there was no coherent body of principles which, as a whole, could be
described as “administrative law”. In the same way as there was until the end of the
19th century no “law of tort” or “law of contract” but rather “laws” of diverse writs
of action, “administrative law” as a body of principles did not exist.
I described the “origin story” of contemporary administrative law in Part III.
Suffice it to say that academic, political and judicial efforts had combined to
produce, by the end of the 20th century, a recognizable body of principles called
“administrative law”, pursuant to which administrative decision-makers were
required to act lawfully, rationally and procedurally fairly.112 Given that administrative law was no longer restrained within procedural shackles, there was no
boundary to the development of these principles. Moreover, the casting off of the
procedural shackles has been accompanied by the casting off of conceptual shackles:
111

R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Fire Brigades’ Union,
[1995] 2 A.C. 513, at 567.
112

Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, [1985] A.C. 374, at
410. This typology does not map neatly onto Canadian law, where reasonableness and
fairness are now the touchstones for reviewing courts, but it is nonetheless invoked from time
to time. See e.g. Canada (Attorney General) v. TeleZone Inc., [2010] S.C.J. No. 62, 2010
SCC 62, at para. 24 (S.C.C.).
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the classiﬁcations, divides and distinctions which characterized earlier eras have
gradually been removed, with contextual analysis to the fore. In the case law,
references abound to the importance of context: the duty of fairness is entirely
context-sensitive,113 as is the duty to consult;114 Vavilovian reasonableness review
is heavily inﬂuenced by context,115 as are judicial responses to claims of nonjusticiability;116 and in applying the law of standing, judges are exhorted to take a
purposive and ﬂexible approach to a multitude of factors.117
When judicial review analysis is contextual (rather than categorical), the focus of
a reviewing court will invariably be on whether the decision as a whole meets the
relevant standard of reasonableness or fairness, which depends on a holistic
assessment of the decision. No avenues of analysis or lines of inquiry are
categorically blocked off. With context to the fore, the primary question for the
judge becomes whether the decision is justiﬁable, in terms of reasonableness or
fairness. The ultimate question, to be assessed holistically, will be whether a given
“exercise of delegated public power can be ‘justiﬁed to citizens in terms of
rationality and fairness’”.118 Making this determination does not necessarily require
“an unstructured (and sometimes instinctive) overall judgement”.119 That the
judge’s determination is contextual does not mean it is a purely subjective
assessment of whether the decision should stand or fall. A judge conducting a
judicial review is hemmed in by a variety of objective considerations: institutional
constraints, constitutional constraints and prior jurisprudence applying the concepts
of reasonableness and fairness to other administrative decisions.120 Nonetheless, I
suggest, the development of a culture of justiﬁcation is much easier where the law
of judicial review of administrative action is context-sensitive and does not depend
on categorical analysis. Accordingly, my hypothesis is that the decoupling of
113

Knight v. Indian Head School Division No. 19, [1990] S.C.J. No. 26, [1990] 1 S.C.R.
653, at 682 (S.C.C.); Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999]
S.C.J. No. 39, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, at paras. 21-28 (S.C.C.).
114
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115
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Canada (Attorney General) v. Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against
Violence Society, [2012] S.C.J. No. 45, 2012 SCC 45, at paras. 35-38 (F.C.A.).
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Administrative Tribunals and Courts in Maintaining the Rule of Law” (1998) 12 Can. J.
Admin. L. & Prac. 171, at 174.
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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), at 2.
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See generally Paul Daly, “Substantive Review in the Common Law World: AAA v.
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administrative law from the prerogative writs and the rise of contextual analysis
facilitated the rise of a culture of justiﬁcation.
Second, and very much relatedly, the reasons and records of administrative
decisions reviewed by judges are now much more extensive than in previous eras.
In Anisminic, the claimant was given a one-page letter stating — not explaining —
the Foreign Compensation Commission’s conclusion.121 Modern records are voluminous; modern reasons extensive. Administrative proceedings are, increasingly,
subject to the open-court principle;122 access to information legislation imposes high
standards of transparency on administrative decision-makers; there are many
statutory obligations to give reasons for decisions; considerations of fairness
between individual and institutional litigants drive the publication on decisionmakers’ websites of scores of decisions; and technological advances facilitate the
production of reasons even in respect of large numbers of applications “by
employing information technology, using decision templates, drop-down menus and
other software”.123 And while courts are not permissive when it comes to what may
be put in the record placed before the reviewing courts,124 they are certainly much
less fastidious than they were in previous eras.125
The upshot is that a judge conducting a judicial review hearing will have a large
volume of material on her desk, reasons running potentially into the hundreds of
pages, supported quite possibly by an even more extensive record. It is only natural
for courts reviewing reasoned decisions to focus on the internal coherence of the
reasons given, interrogating whether they do indeed justify the decision given.126 A
judicial review judge is likely to consider that she has the capacity to test whether
121
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para. 71, per Lord Reed.
124
See generally Bernard v. Canada (Revenue Agency), [2015] F.C.J. No. 1396, 2015
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[2020] B.C.J. No. 495, 2020 BCSC 455, at para. 80 (B.C.S.C.):
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the decision-maker’s conclusions follow from their premises: there is no special
expertise required to assess whether a decision is logical and rational, or whether it
is justiﬁable in view of the relevant legal and factual constraints. Where there were
no reasons to scrutinize, as in previous eras, it was much more difficult for judges
to conclude that an administrative decision should be quashed.
I would push the point further still. Where reasons were never given for
administrative decisions, the ﬂaws in those decisions or in public administration
generally were concealed from the judicial eye. Once reasons came to be given more
or less as a matter of course, public administration was on display, warts and all. As
soon as judges became aware of shortcomings in public administration (or even of
the potential for shortcomings), was it not inevitable that they would develop more
exacting standards of reasonableness and fairness to hold administrative decisionmakers to account? It is not, I hypothesize, more exacting standards of judicial
review which have caused more expansive reason-giving and record-generation; it
is expansive reason-giving and record generation which have caused more exacting
standards of reasonableness and fairness.
In summary, my hypothesis for the rise of the culture of justiﬁcation rests on two
interrelated factors which are largely internal to administrative law: the development
of context-sensitive general principles of judicial review of administrative action;
and the expansion of reasons for administrative decisions and the accompanying
records for judicial review.
V. THE FUTURE

OF JUSTIFICATION

If my hypothesis is correct, the implication is that the culture of justiﬁcation in
administrative law is here to stay. Even reversals in global trends — the exogenous
factors I identiﬁed in Part IV — would not cause the culture of justiﬁcation to
putrefy. Reasonableness and fairness will continue to be robust and context-sensitive
constraints on administrative action. The details of these constraints may, however,
vary over time. The reader of Vavilov could be forgiven for having a slight sense of
déjà vu: in Dunsmuir, the language of “justiﬁcation, transparency and intelligibility”
was already said to be central to reasonableness review;127 yet a few short years
after Dunsmuir, the Supreme Court had already abandoned these high justiﬁcatory
standards. In this Part, I will assess the future prospects of the culture of justiﬁcation
in substantive review in Canadian administrative law. I will suggest that Vavilovian
reasonableness review represents a repudiation of the culture of authority which had
crept into substantive review in the years leading up to Vavilov. This signals that
some decision-makers, who have previously been able to rely on their authority to
convince courts to uphold their decisions as reasonable, will henceforth ﬁnd
themselves required to support their decisions with reasoned analysis. The postDunsmuir slippage is unlikely to be repeated.
To begin with, recall that Mureinik drew a contrast between the culture of
127
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justiﬁcation and the culture of authority. In a culture of justiﬁcation, decisions must
be justiﬁed — reasoned decision-making, responsiveness, demonstrated expertise,
and contextualism will be critical. But in a culture of authority, a decision-maker can
rule by edicts unsupported by reason.128 The contrast between justiﬁcation and
authority can be perceived by reference to previous eras of judicial review of
administrative action in Canada, in which decision-makers had the “right to be
wrong” within their exclusive areas of jurisdiction.129 A good example is Commission des relations ouvrières du Québec v. Burlington Mills Hosiery Co. of
Canada.130 The exclusion of employees under the age of 16 from a bargaining unit
by the Commission had resulted in the certiﬁcation of a negotiating group. The
employer’s application for judicial review failed. As Abbott J. explained, determinations as to who was “to be included or excluded from a bargaining unit” was one
of the Board’s “principal functions” and fell within its “exclusive jurisdiction”:
“provided it exercises that discretion in good faith its decision is not subject to
judicial review”.131 The Commission had authority — conferred by statute — and,
128
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as long as it did not egregiously abuse its powers, no court could review the merits
of the Commission’s decisions.
There is plainly a world of difference between Burlington Mills and Vavilov:
generations of judges, scholars and advocates have woven Canadian administrative
law into an altogether different fabric. Nonetheless, one of the problems with
Canadian administrative law prior to Vavilov was that a culture of authority had
crept into substantive review. In Dunsmuir, reasonableness review was said to have
two components: a decision should fall within the “possible, acceptable outcomes in
light of the facts and the law” and the reasoning process leading up to it should bear
the hallmarks of “justiﬁcation, transparency and intelligibility”.132 It did not take
long, however, for the high bar of “justiﬁcation, transparency and intelligibility” to
be signiﬁcantly lowered: by 2013 it was already enough for a decision’s reasoning
process to be comprehensible.133 As for “possible, acceptable outcomes”, it soon
became clear that the task of a reviewing court was outcome-focused; as long as the
decision fell within the range of possible, acceptable outcomes, a reviewing court
ought to uphold it, even if aspects of the decision were curious or key points were
glossed over.134 As long as the reviewing court was persuaded that reasons “could
be offered” in support of the outcome, it ought to uphold the decision in question.135
And almost all administrative decision-making was subject to an across-the-board
presumption of reasonableness review.136 Some decision-makers could therefore
rely on their authority — the fact that they had been empowered by statute and were
presumptively expert137 — to prevail in judicial review proceedings, without having
to justify their decisions.
Consider the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Tran v. Canada (Minister
of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness).138 The Supreme Court allowed Mr.
Tran’s appeal but sidestepped the problems illustrated by the Federal Court of
No. 65, [1968] S.C.R. 839 (S.C.C.). See further Paul Daly, “The Struggle for Deference in
Canada” in Mark Elliott & Hanna Wilberg, eds., The Scope and Intensity of Substantive
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Appeal’s decision.139 At issue here was the decision of a ministerial delegate, based
in large part on a report from a front-line Canadian Border Services Agency official,
to refer Mr. Tran to an inadmissibility hearing. Neither the officer nor the delegate
was a lawyer. Mr. Tran, a long-time permanent resident of Canada, had been part of
a marijuana cultivation operation, for which he received a 12-month conditional
sentence.
Section 36(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act140 provides that
individuals are inadmissible to Canada upon conviction for either (i) committing an
offence punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years; or (ii)
committing an offence for which a term of imprisonment of more than six months
is imposed. Mr. Tran raised issues on both of the branches of section 36(1)(a). First,
between his commission of the offence and his conviction, the maximum term of
imprisonment had been increased for his offence (production of a controlled
substance) from 7 years to 14 years. Pursuant to section 11 of the Charter, Mr. Tran
could only be sentenced to a maximum of seven years. But was the delegate so
constrained, or could he look to the maximum term of imprisonment at the time he
had to decide whether to refer Mr. Tran for an admissibility hearing? Second, was
Mr. Tran’s conditional sentence a “term of imprisonment” in excess of six months?
Mr. Tran made additional submissions on his personal circumstances.
Justice Gauthier upheld the decision as reasonable, but with evident distaste. The
ﬁrst problem was that the delegate had not developed “a purposive and contextual
analysis” of section 36(1)(a).141 Given the issues at stake, the absence of a detailed
interpretation in the delegate’s decision was a signiﬁcant shortcoming. For one, the
rule of lenity — that penal provisions be construed in favour of the accused — is at
least arguably in play. For another, the potential retrospective application of an
increase in a sentencing provision calls attention to Charter values.142 In addition,
Mr. Tran observed that the delegate’s approach could give rise to absurd situations,
such as where the maximum sentence for an offence committed long ago is later
increased, rendering the individual suddenly liable to removal from Canada. Yet
Gauthier J.A. felt compelled, in light of the Supreme Court’s instruction to pay
attention to reasons that could have been offered — but were not actually offered —
in support of a decision, to accept any reasonable interpretation which was implicit
in the delegate’s decision: “deference due to a tribunal does not disappear because
its decision on a certain issue is implicit”.143 This recalls the Burlington Mills
139
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approach of reﬂexive deference to a decision-maker operating in an area of
exclusive jurisdiction, even where they evidently have not even considered the
principles at stake. Yet, as Gauthier J.A. observed, this is what the Supreme Court
jurisprudence seemed to require.
Second, it would also have been reasonable for the delegate to construe the
provisions in favour of Mr. Tran.144 Indeed, in respect of the second branch of
section 36(1)(a), Gauthier J.A. wrote, it is “obviously open” to the decision-makers
“to adopt another interpretation should they believe it is warranted”.145 Another
decision-maker could adopt a different interpretation in the future. Concretely, this
meant that the rights and obligations of permanent residents and foreign nationals
convicted of crimes in similar circumstances to Mr. Tran’s could well depend on
whether they appeared before decision-maker A or decision-maker B.146 The
decision-maker had the authority to decide — one way, or another, and back again
— and, à la Burlington Mills, that was that.
Of course, Tran is only one case. Hardly anyone familiar with Canadian
administrative law would think that by the mid-2010s the clock had suddenly turned
back to 1960. The point is that there is absolutely no chance, post-Vavilov, that Tran
would be decided the same way. The authority of the ministerial delegate —
empowerment by statute and presumptive expertise — would not be enough on its
own to support the decision. Indeed, in a case argued and decided soon after Vavilov,
Gauthier J.A. (the author of Tran) quashed a decision as unreasonable precisely on
the basis that the decision-maker had failed to engage with the key issues and central
arguments raised by the applicant, pointedly commenting that whereas she would
have upheld the decision prior to Vavilov, it could not stand in view of the Supreme
Court’s new articulation of reasonableness review.147
Given the centrality of reasoned decision-making, responsiveness, demonstrated expertise and contextualism, it comes as no surprise that Canadian courts
post-Vavilov have not been sympathetic to decision-makers who might have relied
prior to Vavilov on their authority rather than their ability to justify their decisions.
Ministers, for example, might be said to possess political authority in addition to
statutory authority. But ministerial decision-making based on sparse or non-existent
reasons has been subjected to stringent reasonableness review in the wake of
S.C.J. No. 50, 2017 SCC 50, at para. 44 (S.C.C.).
144
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Vavilov.148 For reasons of expediency, line decision-makers in busy governmental
offices engaged in the mass adjudication of hundreds or thousands of claims for
welfare beneﬁts, occupational licences or immigration visas might be given
deference on the basis that they simply do not have the time to engage deeply with
every ﬁle that comes across their desks. But there has not been much post-Vavilov
sympathy for those toiling on the front lines.149 In Rodriguez Martinez v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), McHaffie J. observed that while
institutional constraints “must inform the assessment of reasonableness”,150 the
demands of responsive mean that a decision-maker — even a line decision-maker —
must nonetheless respond to the evidence presented to it.151 And in Osun v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), a boilerplate comment to the effect that
the decision-maker had given a piece of evidence “careful consideration” was
insufficient, as the decision lacked an “assessment” of the evidence.152 Authority is
not enough; justiﬁcation is the order of the day.153
Claims of technocratic authority are those most likely to challenge the culture of
justiﬁcation. It is instructive to consider labour law. The impetus for deference on
administrative interpretations of law originally came from scholars and judges
concerned that judicial intervention was undermining the ability of expert labour
law decision-makers to perform their functions.154 Labour arbitrators form part of a
relatively small community of labour lawyers and activists: union advocates,
148
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management advocates and arbitrators (typically drawn from the union or management side). Everyone knows everyone. And they speak a common dialect, not
necessarily one the uninitiated will readily understand. Moreover, labour disputes
often have a long history, such that those involved typically are intimately familiar
with the case at hand. Finally, labour decisions sometimes have to be taken very
quickly. When all or some of these factors are in play, the reasons given by a labour
law decision-maker may be sparse, bordering on solipsistic. Yet the decision-maker
might nonetheless have a claim to authority based on his or her expertise. It is
notable that the post-Dunsmuir decision which is most closely identiﬁed with the
culture of authority — Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v. Newfoundland
and Labrador (Treasury Board)155 — involved judicial review of a labour
arbitration decision. But it would be dangerous to assume that comparable latitude
will be shown in the labour law ﬁeld and analogous areas subsequent to Vavilov.
Accordingly, the real test of the culture of justiﬁcation post-Vavilov is likely to
come in a case or cases involving technocratic authority. But the omens from the
case law on political legitimacy and authority based on expediency do not augur
well for labour boards and their ilk. After Vavilov, deference will have to be earned,
not asserted; expertise must be demonstrated, and will not be assumed.156 Having
seen how the culture of authority crept into substantive review, leading to decisions
like Tran just a few years after “justiﬁcation, transparency and intelligibility” were
said in Dunsmuir to be hallmarks of reasonableness, Canadian courts will probably
retain their robust post-Vavilov commitment to the culture of justiﬁcation as
embodied in Vavilovian reasonableness review’s requirements of reasoned decisionmaking, responsiveness, demonstrated expertise and contextualism.
VI. CONCLUSION
My orientation heretofore has been descriptive and analytical. I have sought to
describe and analyze the culture of justiﬁcation in contemporary administrative law,
with particular reference to the majority reasons in Vavilov. As I explained in Part
II, the importance accorded to reasoned decision-making, responsiveness, demonstrated expertise and contextualism helps to enhance understanding of the
culture of justiﬁcation. In Part III, I expanded on the discussion of Vavilov, a case
concerned with substantive review – the assessment of the reasonableness of
administrative decisions – and described how the culture of justiﬁcation has
permeated other areas of administrative law, such as procedural fairness, justiciability and standing. I then ventured, in Part IV, to explain why the culture of
155
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237, at para. 44 (F.C.A.).
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justiﬁcation has risen to such prominence in contemporary administrative law;
focusing on endogenous rather than exogenous factors I identiﬁed the development
of general principles of administrative law and the rise in reasoned decision-making
as likely contributors. Finally, in Part V, I assessed the future prospects of the culture
of justiﬁcation. Noting that a culture of authority had crept into substantive review
in Canadian administrative law in the years leading up to Vavilov, I suggested that
the majority’s approach represents a repudiation of the culture of authority. Those
claiming authority based on political legitimacy and expediency have been given
short shrift by Canadian courts in the wake of Vavilov. I cautioned that the
commitment of Vavilovian reasonableness review to the culture of justiﬁcation is
most likely to be tested in cases involving technocratic claims of authority, as in the
area of labour law, but noted that the omens for the post-Vavilov health of the culture
of justiﬁcation look good.
Having bracketed normative questions at the outset, I return to address them now.
There are good normative reasons to support a culture of justiﬁcation in administrative law, grounded in the rule of law and democracy, two of the unwritten
principles of the Canadian constitutional order.157 Although the majority reasons
hardly invoke the rule of law in their elaboration of Vavilovian reasonableness
review, it is not difficult to discern a thick conception of the rule of law at play (or,
alternatively, a substantive and not merely formal conception of the rule of law).158
As Jeffrey Jowell has observed, the rule of law is “a principle of institutional
morality”,159 from which certain commitments follow for a modern liberal democracy with an administrative state: “The equal dignity of citizens, with its implications for fair treatment and respect for individual autonomy, is the basic premise of
liberal constitutionalism, and accordingly the ultimate meaning of the rule of
law.”160 On this thick, substantive conception, the rule of law in modern liberal
democracies is concerned with the promotion of individual dignity and autonomy,
on an equal basis.161 In terms of judicial review, “the distinctively judicial
public-law task . . . is the protection of individual rights and interests against undue
encroachment in the name of social interests”.162 The effort in Vavilov to put the
individual at the centre of the reason-giving process and the emphasis placed on
157
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responsiveness to the individual and reasoned decision-making as well as the
contextual nature of reasonableness review reﬂect a thick, substantive conception
of the rule of law.
There is also a thick, substantive conception of democracy at play. A culture of
justiﬁcation is not designed simply to protect individuals, but to empower them. As
Dyzenhaus has observed, a deferential approach to judicial review means that
decisions can be upheld because they are justiﬁable “rather than because the
conclusion reached by the body happens to coincide with the conclusion that the
judges would have considered correct without the beneﬁt of engagement with the
administrative body’s reasons”.163 In other words, a culture of justiﬁcation empowers administrative decision-makers, giving them the autonomy to ﬂesh out the
meaning of the statutes and constitutional provisions they are required to apply;
these are the characteristics of reasoned decision-making and demonstrated
expertise at play. And a culture of justiﬁcation also empowers the individuals who
encounter administrative decision-makers. Because an administrative decisionmaker must be responsive to the individuals it encounters, it must take on board their
views and arguments about the meaning of statutes and constitutional provisions,
always attentive to the context in which a decision falls to be made. A culture of
justiﬁcation requires or at least provides for the possibility of the “continuous
process of discussion” which is the lifeblood of the unwritten constitutional
principle of democracy.164
This is not to argue that the culture of justiﬁcation is a panacea,165 that its full
potential will be realized in every case166 or that the majority reasons in Vavilov are
beyond reproach,167 but simply to suggest that the culture of justiﬁcation deserves
the prominence it now has and seems set to enjoy well into the future.
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